Current neuroscientific explanations regularly refer to internal “neural representations” in explaining cognitive phenomena, yet the nature of these representations remains obscure. Many maintain that these are natural representational entities which carry “original”, or “intrinsic” contents. We argue against this naturalistic view and aim to show that neural representations are partially dependent on subjective explanatory considerations. First, we show that neuroscientists routinely regard the same neural state as a representation of multiple distinct contents. We maintain that such content multiplicity is a characteristic feature of the increasingly prevalent population approach in neuroscience. Second, we argue that naturalistic theories are inadequate to explain content multiplicity. This follows from a crucial property of any representation, namely, that it is an exclusive relation. Naturalistic theories are incapable of defining one exclusive content from a multitude of options without turning to subjective considerations. Therefore, the only way to account for content multiplicity is to accept that subjective considerations have a constitutive role in defining the contents of neural representations.